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According to both Peirce and Eco metaphor can play an important role in the 
generation of sense and new knowledge. When Peirce defined metaphor as a 
hypoicon he was a scholastic realist. Before his “epistemic break” in the 
nineties Eco, on the other hand, was a nominalist - even though Eco was  highly 
inspired by Peirce´s ideas of signifying construction as an unlimited sign- 
exchanging process. This fundamental epistemological difference necessarily 
gives some evident differences in the perception of metaphor. Some of these 
differences will be presented in the following article. 
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Introduction 
The present article offers a tentative comparison between the concepts of 
metaphor as put forth by the philosophers Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and 
Umberto Eco (1936-). The motivation for the comparison lies in the fact that 
according to both philosophers metaphor enhances the process of 
representation, invention and interpretation; or metaphor can play an important 
part in the generation of sense and new knowledge. In his theory of metaphor, 
Eco draws heavily on Peirce`s concepts of the interpretant and infinite semiosis. 
This even though Eco before his epistemic break in the late nineties distinctively, 
figures as a structuralist thinker (though in opposition to the anthropologist C. 
Levi-Strauss) and a nominalist. The mature Peirce on the other hand was a 
scholastic realist when he defined the metaphor as a hypoicon. This fundamental 
epistemological difference necessarily gives some evident differences in the 
perception of metaphor. Some of these differences will be presented below. 




A conceptual condition concerning the comparison 
The metaphorical signifying process is defined by Peirce and Eco from within two 
very different semiotic horizons. Firstly (Peirce), a phanero-semeiotic horizon 
where the metaphorical sign is related to (i) an explicitly modal schematics and 
where (ii) an all-encompassing realism is at work: a potential qualitative mode of 
being, a factual mode of being, and, finally, a law-like mode of being are 
admitted to being real; consequently, their being is the case independently of 
what anyone happens to think, wish or feel (cf. EP II: 1791 pp; Fisch 1986: 173). 
Secondly (Eco), a (methodological) structural-semantic horizon where (i) the 
content of the metaphorical sign is emphasized and described as a structural 
relationship within a (more or less orderly) system of cultural entities, semantic 
markers; thus, not said that these structural relationships are coagulated, or 
fixed and defined once and for all, on the contrary, these form open or dynamic 
series - in full agreement with Peirce’s idea of the interpretant and the infinite 
semiosis. And (ii) where a nominalistic notion is fundamental: the signs which we 
use when referring to our surroundings – natural or cultural - are purely 
conventional and are not depending on a world of real phenomena. In turn, the 
properties of these phenomena and the laws which govern them have no real 
mode of being, but, rather, they depend on the ways in which language or other 
sign systems define things.     
 
Peirce and Eco on metaphor and similarity 
In relation to both Peirce and Eco, it seems difficult to discuss the metaphorical 
sign and signifying process without referring explicitly to a concept of similarity. 
However, according to the two gentlemen, not surprisingly, the similarity is 
made possible by a number of features and characters that are quite different. 
Peirce defined the metaphor as a sign of the iconic or hypoiconic type; more 
accurately, the definition regards the way in which metaphor takes part of the 
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category of Firstness (cf. CP: 22772). Hence, the similarity of the metaphor is 
related to a series of (phaneroskopic-) qualitative characteristics. In his lecture 
"The Seven Systems of Metaphysics", where Peirce used his categories to 
characterize seven systems of metaphysics by which categories are admitted as 
important metaphysico-cosmical elements, he could conclude that he himself 
was an: ”…Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going 
much further in the direction of scholastic realism.” (CP: 5.77n1). From being a 
nominalistic thinker Peirce had thus become what Fisch (1986) very aptly names: 
"... a three-category realist." (: 195). In a draft to a letter addressed to Russell 
c.1908, Peirce described his (new) position in the following way: 
 
Next, I ask, what are the different kinds of reals? They are 1st those whose 
being lies in the substance of the thought itself, mere ideas, objects 
logically possible, the objects of pure mathematical thought for example. 
2nd those whose being consits in their connexions with other things, 
existents, reacting things. 3rd those whose being consists in their 
connecting two or more other things; - laws, generals, signs, etc. In short 
the real is ultimately undeniable. (MS L387b, 003503)  
 
Thus, Peirce argued for the reality of all three categories claiming that each is 
really operative in nature; not only law or habit, which will regulate events in the 
future and actual events, or fact, are admitted to be real, Peirce also understood 
the potential quality as having a real being. In an attempt to describe the 
similarities between his own realism and James’ emphasis on real possibilities in 
"The Dilemma of Determinism "(1884), Peirce concluded that: ”The possible is a 
positive universe.” (CP: 8.308). To the extent that there are real Thirds, there 
must also be real Firsts. So Peirce rejected the nominalist view that the possible 
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is simply and solely what we do not know not to be true. The quality is still 
possible or is what it is as possibility without being actualized or made 
intelligible. The possible is not identical with what the actual makes it to be. If we 
think so, we make ourselves, according to Peirce, guilty of, as he wrote in The 
Logic of Mathematics: “an Attempt to develop my Categories from within” (c. 
1896), putting the cart before the horse: “…let us not put the cart before the 
horse, nor the evolved actuality before the possibility as if the latter involved 
what it only evolves.” (CP: 1.422). And compared to Thirdness, the potential 
quality is characterized by, as Peirce wrote in "Minute Logic" (1903-04): 
”a…mode of being, the characteristic of which is that things that are real 
whatever they really are, independently of any assertion about them.” (CP: 
6.349). 
Therefore, Peirce`s definition of metaphor should be understood in the 
light of his extreme realism, and with affinity to this we can say that the relation 
of similarity in metaphor emanates from a real possibility; also remembering that 
when Peirce was defining the hypoicon metaphor, he was indeed writing about 
its “mode of Firstness”. Thus, it is Firstness which is the foundation of the 
signification-interpretation process of the metaphor; or the metaphorical 
similarity depends on Firstness for its generation of sense and new knowledge.  
Even the most imaginative metaphor must emanate from and reflect Firstness. 
To Peirce, similarity cannot be invented, it can only be discovered; there is not a 
state of “anything goes” concerning the invention and interpretation of the 
metaphorical sign. The phaneroscopical quality, which the metaphor possesses 
qua representamen, has its distinctive mode of being before the metaphor 
represents a given object and before a given consciousness discovers the 
similarity as being a similarity in the metaphorical process of semeiosis. As Peirce 
wrote concerning to the representative character of the iconic representamen in 
his article “Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic” (c. 1903):    
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The Icon has no dynamical connection with the object it represents; it 
simply happens that its qualities resemble those of that object, and excite 
analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness. (CP: 2.299) 
 
Consequently, consciousness does not create the salient quality of the 
metaphorical similarity. What happens is that the metaphorical representamen 
takes part in a relation of similarity with an object and that the consciousness 
perceives this relation as being a similarity; the metaphorical representamen as 
such precedes this relationship, or is “really unconnected” with both the object 
of the sign and the consciousness which is discovering the similarity. In the article 
“A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (1908), Peirce furthermore gave 
the following description of the first universe of experience familiar to all of us – 
namely Firstness:  
 
Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises 
all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure 
mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within 
that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in 
mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's actually thinking them, 
saves their Reality. (CP: 6.455) 
 
Consequently, the metaphorical idea or the qualitative potential is real – sui 
generis – with close affinity to Peirce’s realistic viewpoint; even if the idea only 
has its distinctive existence when it is actualized, is made an event, or becomes 
something particular (Secondness) that can be included in some general category 
in a process of reasoning (Thirdness). Or maybe better put: also the indexical-
referential and the symbolic conventional is at play in the invention and 
interpretation of the metaphorical similarity – to be meaningful a metaphor 
must be related to a universe of discourse, being fictive or real (a condition 
which relates to what might be called the representative condition of the 
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metaphor), and represent something for someone, i.e. be based on an idea of a 
representamen, which is made possible by discoursive registers and code-
parameters (a condition which relates to what might be called the interpretative 
condition of the metaphor). How ever that may be, it is nevertheless from a real, 
objectively given Firstness that the metaphorical similarity grows; that is, it is 
Firstness which motivates its growth. (For a similar conclusion, see Haley 1988)  
To Eco, who tries to pin down the (structural-) semantic features of the 
metaphorical similarity, the metaphor emerges from the paradigm, the code, 
and the content-system. And thus the metaphor can be defined as a substitution 
of a term for another on the basis of a relation of semantic-positional similarity 
(cf. Eco 1979: 79). To Eco, the metaphorical similarity has to be found within the 
code; it is a similarity concerning inherent relations between semantic markers, 
that is, interpretants within a semantic network – a network which in principle 
takes on a global format.  
Eco stresses that similarity has nothing to do with presumed ontological 
relations or the structure of reality itself. Similarity is coherent, not motivated, 
and depends only on a set of rules and conventions of a symbolic character. Or in 
other words, similarity is determined culturally – with close affinity to the 
nominalistic thesis.  Consequently, if we want to be able to analyze and 
understand the concept of similarity we must not make any recourse to the 
world of objects and things; similarity is a purely semiotical matter according to 
Eco. This is also in consistence with the fact that Eco does not grant the referent 
any place in his definition of the sign; he even speaks of the “referential fallacy”, 
that is, the erroneous assumption that the content of an expression has anything 
to do with a corresponding referent. Eco does not want to deny the existence of 
objects in an extra-semiotic world, but what he wants is to avoid making an 
ontological commitment of any sort. In “the Role of the Reader” (1979) (abbr. 
RR), he writes:    
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Within the theory of codes it is unnecessary to resort to the notion of 
extension, nor to that of possible worlds; the codes…set up a ´cultural` 
world which is neither actual nor possible in the ontological sense; its 
existence is linked to a cultural order, which is the way in which a society 
thinks and speaks. (Eco 1979: 61)   
 
Eco stresses that an ontological commitment only will cause the sign function to 
become related to something, which it should not, the referent. Whether the 
referent is considered as being an object, a thing, or an idea, the referent should 
not be a subject of investigation within the framework of a theory of 
signification. Instead, Eco decides that similarity must depend on: ”the fact that 
in the code there exist already fixed relations of substitution which, in some way, 
link the substitute entities to those substituted for” (Eco 1979: 79). And in 
connection to this, in his work “Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language” 
(1984) (abbr. SPL), he specifies the relation of similarity in the following way:  
 
By similarity between two…semantic properties we mean the fact that in a 
given system of content those properties are named by the same 
interpretant, whether it be verbal or not, and independently of the fact 
that the objects or things for the designation of which that interpretant is 
customarily used may manifest perceptual ”similarities” (Eco 1984: 113) 
 
It is only due to the fact that there exists a universe of content, a given s-code as 
structure, organized into a network of interpretants (in coherence with Peirce’s 
concept of “infinite semeiosis” and “the global semantic network”, whose format 
is the “Q-model” 4), interpretants which decide similarity (and with that, 
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differences) between features, that a given entity metaphorically can substitute 
another. In SPL, Eco says: 
 
The…metaphor is a function of the sociocultural format of the interpreting 
subjects` encyclopedia. In this perspective, metaphors are produced solely 
on the basis of a rich cultural framework, on the basis, that is, of a universe 
of content that is already organized into networks of interpretants, which 
decide (semiotically) the identities and differences of the properties. (Eco 
1984: 127) 
 
Or put in another way: similarity concerns a purely semantic operation within the 
code, it is a similarity between interpretants or cultural units; the similarity 
depends on a cultural agreement, on how features are defined by the aid of 
language (or another sign system), not on how things are, or are presumed to be 
– “in themselves”.  In connection to this we may also remember Eco’s 
controversy with Levi-Strauss (cf. Eco 1971: 350 pp) and his dismissal of the 
“system of systems”, or the a priori natural code, which, by virtue of analogy, is 
motivated by the trans-humane world. The generation of meaning is – according 
to Eco, independent of any motivation, let alone “naturalization”, rather we face, 
as M. McCanles (1977) writes in his lucid article: ”Conventions of the Natural and 
Naturalness of Convention: ”…a process of inventing and communicating 
meaning wherein ”meaning” itself is wholly internal to the process itself” 
(McCanles 1977: 55). According to Eco, we do not need any ontological system of 
essences or the like which make up the condition of signification and 
communication. In “A Theory of Semiotics” (1976) (abbr. TSE) Eco states the 
following: 
  
Within the framework of a theory of codes it is unnecessary to resort to the 
notion of extension, nor to that of possible worlds; the codes, insofar as 
they are accepted by a society, set up a cultural world which is neither 
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actual nor possible in the ontological sense; its existence is linked to a 
cultural order, which is the way in which a society, thinks speaks and, while 
speaking, explains the purport of its thought through other thoughts. (Eco 
1976: 61) 
 
Precisely therefore, Eco can argue that the similarity of metaphor must be based 
on contingent, cultural conventions, and that the similarity concerns how entities 
are similar within a given semantic network. In short, Eco argues against – with 
M. Caesar's (1999) words from the fine work: ”Umberto Eco. Philosophy, 
Semiotics and the Work of fiction”:…any privileging of the idea of language, 
under the shield of metaphor, as expressing things outside language” (Caesar 
1999: 72). According to Eco, the metaphorical similarity can be invented, not only 
discovered. However, this does not mean that “anything goes”, concerning the 
invention and interpretation of the metaphor. The semantic network is 
characterized by having what seems to be “Swedish stall-bars…”, which thanks to 
their: ”…grill of parallel and perpendicular bars” (Eco 1979: 78), is structuring the 
series of interpretants selected by both the maker and the addressee of the 
metaphor. In TSE Eco gives an example of this process. Confronted with a new 
and intriguing metaphor the addressee senses the legitimacy of the similarity 
only vaguely or indistinctively and attributes to the maker of the metaphor 
superior intuitive abilities. But in fact, the maker of the metaphor has just had a 
quick glimpse of the paths which the semantic network allows him to cross when 
making the relation of similarity: 
 
When this process is rapid and unexpected and joins up very distant points, 
it appears as a ”jump” and the addressee, though confusedly sensing its 
legitimacy does not detect the series of steps within the underlying 
semantics chain that join the apparently disconnected points together. As a 
result he believes that the rhetorical invention was the product of an 
intuitive perception, a sort of illumination, or a sudden revelation, whereas 
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in fact the sender has simply caught a glimpse of the paths that the 
semantic organisation entitled him to cross. What was for him a rapid and 
distinct look at the possibilities of the system becomes for the addressee 
something vague and indistinct. The latter attributes to the former a 
superior intuitive capacity, whereas the former knows that he had a more 
imediate and articulated view of the underlying structure of the semantic 
system. (Eco 1976: 284) 
 
Hence, the imaginative effort establishing the metaphorical similarity is ”always-
already anticipated” or foreseen within the code, or is nothing but, as Eco writes 
in RR: 
 
…a rationation that traverses the paths of the semantic labyrinths in a 
hurry and, in its haste, loses their sense of their rigid structure. The 
creative imagination can perform such dangerous excercises because there 
exist ”swedish stall-bars” which support it and which suggest movements 
to it. (Eco 1979: 78) 
 
Eco on metaphor and metonymi and Peirce on metaphor as one of three 
hypoicons 
If we take a closer look at the ”Swedish stallbars”, we will, according to Eco, be 
able to see how the structures of these “stallbars” are made up from relations of 
contiguity. And since the metonymy is constituted by the rhetorical rule that a 
term is substituted by one of its interpretants or semantic markers based on a 
relation of contiguity, the metonymical process of substitution and its relation of 
contiguity must underlie every metaphorical semiosis and hence its relation of 
similarity. As Eco writes in “RR”:   
 
…each metaphor can be traced back to a subjacent chain of metonymic 
connections which constitute the frame work of the code and upon which 
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is based the constitution of any semantic field, whether partial or (in 
theory) global. (Eco 1979: 68) 
 
Consequently, the metaphor is founded on the metonymy; or maybe put in a 
more precise way: Eco makes contiguity more privileged than similarity; 
contiguity precedes similarity. This is so because Eco is inclined to, as e.g. Culler 
(1981) contends in his fine work ”The Pursuit of Signs, Semiotic, Literature, 
Deconstruction”, identify “…the metonymy with the code, with language itself as 
a system of arbitrary signs which depend for their identity on the relations with 
one another.” (Culler 1981: 200). 
In “Syllabus of Certain topics of Logic” (c. 1903), Peirce wrote that, 
according to the mode of Firstness of which they partake, hypoicons can roughly 
be divided into three:  
 
Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; 
those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the 
parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; 
those which represent the representative character of a representamen by 
representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (CP: 2.277)      
 
Maybe Peirce is inviting us to think that the differences among the three 
hypoicons is one of degree and not of type? Maybe the three hypoicons are 
points on a scale of abstraction (cf: Jappy 1995: 217 pp.)? According to Peirce, 
the three hypoicons are related phaneroscopically to “the ordinary experience”; 
hence, the image is “First Firstness”, the diagram is “Second Firstness”, and it 
seems safe to assume that the metaphor must be a “Third Firstness”. Since every 
Third, in some way or another, involves both a Second and indirectly a First, 
maybe the hypoiconic metaphor also builds logically and hierarchically upon the 
diagram and the image, respectively? So maybe in a Peircean perspective, as 
with Eco, other sign functions must be present to some degree in any 
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metaphorical form of semeiosis? But the good question is, of course, how? 
Following an interesting suggestion made by M. C. Haley in his excellent work 
“The Semeiosis of Poetic Metaphor” (1988), we can say that the three hypoicons 
form a trichotomic continuum. In this continuum of hypoiconicity, metaphor 
functions as a Third First, or as a “final cause”, being a “whole calling out its 
parts” (cf. CP: 1.220), “calling out” diagrams and images, that is. In the precise 
words of Haley:  
 
My reading of the hypoicons suggests a hierarchical relationship among the 
three: The “metaphor” grounded in a universal archetype, would logically 
include…innumerable possible diagrams an, which would in turn suggest 
many possible images. Or perhaps the relation among the three hypoicons 
may be more aptly conceived as a continuum of iconicity, suggesting in 
every iconic experience there is at least some degree of metaphoricity, 
diagrammaticality, and imagery. (Haley 1988: 34) 
 
Thus, the three hypoicons enter into a sort of reciprocal relation; we  also 
remember how Peirce insisted on the triadic interrelation of the representamen, 
object and interpretant when he was accounting for the action of genuine 
semeiosis. In our case the diagram (Second Firstness) and image (First Firstness) 
are both generated or “called out” by the metaphor (Third Firstness), which on 
the other hand must rely on these two modes of signifying for its functioning;  
e.g. the analogizing of the diagram, which enables structure, and the concrete 
and immediate sensory particularity of the image. Or, as Haley very aptly puts it: 
”[metaphor] needs the rigor of the Peircean diagram to give it structure (to our 
minds), the quality of the Peircean image to give it color (to our senses)” (Haley 
1988: 46). Thus, the hypoiconic metaphor seems to be a good example of how 
Thirdness, according to Peirce is: ”…what it is owing to the parts which it brings 
into mutual relationship.” (CP: 1.363). But of course the metaphor cannot be 
reduced to a sequence consisting of diagrams and images; the diagram and 
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image cannot exhaust the semeiotic potential of the metaphor – the 
metaphorical similarity is more general, more abstract than the analogy of the 
diagram and the simple qualities of the image, respectively. So, as with Eco, we 
find in a Peircean perspective (if we stretch our imagination of little) that 
metaphor naturally and necessarily represents a blending of different sign 
functions; but of course with the hypoicons we hit phaneroscopical bedrock (cf. 
Jappy 1996: 220) and a concern for “the representative quality or character of 
the representamen”, not a study of metaphor where the metaphor emerges 
from the paradigm, the code, and the content-system.  
Furthermore, Eco’s fundamental conclusion that contiguity precedes 
similarity is a conclusion that Peirce would not agree upon. Rather, according to 
Peirce, the opposite must be the case. This we can deduce from at least two 
perspectives: Firstly, from the way in which Peirce described the relation 
between the three fundamental (psychological) principles of association and the 
sign-types – icon, index and symbol. As Peirce wrote in a non-identified text 
fragment:   
 
The association of ideas is said to proceed according to three principles – 
those of resemblance, of contiguity, and of causality. But it would be 
equally true to say that signs denote what they do on the three principles 
of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. There can be no question that 
any thing is a sign of whatever is associated with it by resemblance, by 
contiguity, or by causality. (CP: 1.351) 
 
Since the iconic representamen represents its object by virtue of similarity, and 
the indexical representamen represents its object by virtue of contiguity (while 
the symbolic representamen represents it object by virtue of conventionality, or 
by virtue of habit) and we, according to Peirce, can notice a regular progression 
of one, two and three in the order of representamens, similarity must precede 
contiguity. That similarity must precede contiguity according to Peirce, we can 
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also deduce, quite fundamentally, from Peirce's view on the process of 
evolution. In one of his letters to his old student Christine Ladd-Franklin, Peirce 
wrote the following: 
 
In this chaos of feelings, bits of similitude had appeared, been swallowed 
up again. Had reappeared by chance. A slight tendency to generalization 
had here and there lighted up and been quenched. Had reappeared, had 
strengthened itself. Like had begun to produce like. Then even pairs of 
unlike feelings had begun to have similars, and then these had begun to 
generalize. And thus relations of contiguity, that is connections other than 
similarities, had sprung up. (CP: 8.318) 
 
Thus, the first result of evolution is a continuum of sense qualities: a transition 
from a state of non-determined potentiality to a state of determined 
potentiality, and so we have the possibility for similarity. Only hereafter actuality 
and fact follow, and by that the possibility for contiguity. Hence, similarity 
according to Peirce precedes contiguity in the process of evolution. These two 
different emphases, similarity as preceding contiguity (Peirce) and contiguity as 
preceding similarity (Eco), reveal two very different views on language and 
reasoning and of course on metaphor. In Peirce’s view, language is a device for 
the expression of thought, perceptions and in the end truth. While, according to 
Eco, what language expresses is simply and solely a result of contingent, 
conventional relations and a system of mechanical processes – e.g. Eco writes 
about how he accepts:  
 
a description of language which depends upon a model susceptible to 
translation in binary terms”, and the conclusion is the following: ”In other 
words, it is possible…even though for experimental purposes only for 
limited parts of the Global Semantic System…to construct an automaton 
capable of generating and understanding metaphors. (Eco 1979: 69)  




Eco and Peirce on metaphor as a cognitive mechanism 
But both Peirce and Eco believe that the metaphor is an important vehicle for 
semantic innovation: the metaphor is not merely a rhetorical device or a 
decorative ornamentation, primarily to be found within literary and poetic 
discourses (a view the metaphor often has been associated with during its long 
and rather complicated history). On the contrary, metaphor permeates all forms 
of discourse and expression and takes on a privileged position in the ongoing 
development of signifying processes, being structural to the very process itself. 
Thus, according to Peirce, the metaphor is “rather helpfull” (CP: 2.222), e.g. in 
the process of discovering new symbols, or when already known symbols are 
being endowed with new meaning. It is tempting to say that the metaphor in a 
Peircean perspective is important when the meaning of symbols is being 
stimulated to grow. And growth is inherent in symbols, and the hypoicon is very 
important regarding the very same growth:   
 
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, 
particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons 
and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed 
nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a 
new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of 
symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. A 
symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in 
experience, its meaning grows. (CP: 2.30) 
 
Furthermore, Peirce stressed in the text: ”The Short Logic” (c. 1893): 
 
If a logician had to construct a language de novo--which he actually has 
almost to do--he would naturally say, I shall need prepositions to express 
the temporal relations of before, after, and at the same time with, I shall 
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need prepositions to express the spatial relations of adjoining, containing, 
touching, of in range with, of near to, far from, of to the right of, to the left 
of, above, below, before, behind, and I shall need prepositions to express 
motions into and out of these situations. For the rest, I can manage with 
metaphors. (CP: 2.290, n.1) 
 
In order to fulfil the Kantian requirement of locating objects in space, time and 
motion (cf. Factor 1996: 229), all that a logician needs to construct a language 
from scratch is indexical representations in form of prepositions - and the 
hypoicon metaphor. To Peirce then, the metaphor is not just an added force to 
the (philosophical) language, but is one of its constituent forms. Or rather, to 
Peirce, language is (grosso modo) inherently metaphorical, a fact which the 
infinite metaphorical contributions to the institutionalized poly-semi bear 
witness to. The metaphor fills out gaps in the lexicon of the language, it serves 
the principle of economy, and it delivers names to new experiences, thoughts 
and ideas. In a letter to the philosopher Victoria Lady Welby, in which Peirce 
among other things discussed the difficult problem of “word-formation”, he 
remembered how the metaphor had served him well long time ago, in his 
attempt to invent a language: 
 
…how as a boy I invented a language in which almost every letter of every 
word made a definite contribution to its signification. It involved a 
classification of all possible ideas; and I need not say that it was never 
completed. I remember however a number of features of it. Not only must 
the ideas be classified, but abstract and psychical ideas had to be provided 
with fixed metaphors; such as lofty for pride, ambition etc. (PW 955) 
                                                 
5
 PW refers to Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria 








In a passage from the article “The Ethics of Terminology” (c. 1903), Peirce also 
stressed the importance of the structuring role of metaphor in the production of 
sense and meaning, when he wrote about the metaphor as a possible way in 
which symbols can originate:   
 
Every symbol is, in its origin, either an image of the idea signified, or a 
reminiscence of some individual occurrence, person or thing, connected 
with its meaning, or is a metaphor.(CP: 2.222).  
 
But, is the metaphor only one of three possible ways in which symbols can 
originate, it, however, occupies a prominent place among these, since, as the 
Peirce-scholar C. Hausmann advocates for in his lucid article: ”Peirce and the 
interaction view of metaphor” (1996): 
 
It should be noted that the first and the second ways in which a symbol 
may originate seem to indicate that new significance does not occur. The 
first, imagining, and the second, reminiscing, both signify on the basis of 
something antecedent. The third origin of symbols, metaphor, then, must 
be the only way to open the possibility that a symbol can…have a new 
significance. (: 197)  
 
Thus, it appears that it is only by virtue of the metaphor that the symbol can be 
endowed with new significance and meaning. None of the two other ways in 
which a symbol can originate, i.e. by virtue of "imagining" and ”reminiscing”, can 
provide such an important semiotic effect, since both depend on already 
established relations of meaning. On the other hand, a metaphor can be 
understood as a new relation of meaning.  
To Eco it is in particular thanks to the metaphorical process of signification 
that new pertinences can be created. Signs, objects and interpretants, which 
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until now seemed at a distance within the semantic network, are suddenly being 
brought together in a relation of similarity – with the aid of the metaphor. Put in 
another way, the designation of the metaphor enables: “…something that 
culture has not yet assimilated”, and thereby the invention of new: 
“…combinatory possibilities or semantic couplings…” (Eco 1979: 79). 
Furthermore, Eco stresses how the metaphor can contribute to the 
institutionalized poly-semi, since the new semantic coupling may become a 
“catachresis”, or simply a “dead metaphor”. This happens, gradually, by virtue of 
habit; the metaphor is being absorbed into the language code and becomes an 
ordinary symbol.   
With affinity to the potential creative-semantic function of metaphor, both 
Peirce and Eco see metaphor as being structural to the production of knowledge 
and understanding; in short, metaphor can have a cognitive function. The 
metaphor understood as a new way of using language may thus cause a new way 
of thinking, or is in fact a new way of thinking. Peirce stressed the important 
cognitive function of the metaphor in the following way:“…a pure idea without 
metaphor…is an onion with a peel” (EP II: 392), and he showed how it is through 
the discovery of similarities between e.g. two different universes of experience 
that it is possible to gain new knowledge. In a non-identified text fragment he 
wrote:  
 
We are going to shock the physiological psychologists, for once, by 
attempting, not an account of a hypothesis about the brain, but a 
description of an image which shall correspond, point by point, to the 
different features of the phenomena of consciousness. Consciousness is 
like a bottomless lake… The meaning of this metaphor is that those which 
[are] deeper are discernible only by a greater effort, and controlled only by 
much greater effort…The aptness of this metaphor is very great. (CP: 
7.553-4) 
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Eco on his part in “SPL” notices how: 
 
…the metaphor posits…”posits in a philosophical sense, as “in putting 
before the eyes”…proportion that, wherever it may have been deposited, 
was not before the eyes; or it was before the eyes and the eyes did not see 
it. (Eco 1984: 102) 
 
The question is of course what it is that the metaphor is about, what can it tell 
us, teach us, or make visible? And here, not surprisingly, there is an important 
difference between Peirces and Eco's understanding of what kind of insight the 
metaphor can bring about. To Peirce, the metaphor must be something by 
knowing, from which we can know something more, since it seems to be a very 
fine example of what a representamen is, or at least what a representamen 
could be (cf. CP 8:322). The metaphor can give us insight into a new potentiality, 
a potentiality which never before has been formulated or instantiated verbally or 
by means of any other sign system; a potentiality which nevertheless has a real 
being, sui generis. Or in nuce: the metaphor can give us an insight into the 
dynamics of the real; and in the long run maybe an insight into the very truth 
itself. Thus, to Peirce the iconic representamen has more to do with: “…the living 
character of truth than have either Symbols or Indices.” (CP: 4.531). Maybe 
someone will point out that Peirce in particular must have had the diagrammatic 
icon in mind - and not the metaphorical hypoicon. And it is true indeed that 
Peirce often accentuated the use of the visual diagram in the ongoing processes 
that converge with the generation of meaning and the acquisition of knowledge 
and truth.  But we pay attention to the fact that Peirce wrote “iconic 
representamens”. Thus, the iconic metaphor must also possess a “great 
distinguishing property”, namely, a capacity to reveal the “unexpected truth” 
(CP: 2.279). And if we look into how Peirce described the relation between 
poetry, a form of discourse in which the metaphor is omnipresent, and a very 
powerful, semeiotic mechanism and science and truth, this conclusion seems to 
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be, at least partly, supported. In one of Peirce’s “Lectures on Pragmatism” 
(1903), he said:  
 
Bad poetry is false, I grant; but nothing is truer than true poetry. And let 
me tell the scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate 
observers than they are, except of the special minutiae that the scientific 
man is looking for. I hear you say: "This smacks too much of an 
anthropomorphic conception." I reply that every scientific explanation of a 
natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to 
which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the 
successes of science in its applications to human convenience are 
witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the 
modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there is a 
degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in 
shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the 
universe. (CP: 1.315) 
 
Although the metaphorical hypothesis does not have the same technical form as 
the scientific hypothesis, e.g. the exactness which enables strict falsification (cf. 
Haley 1988), it still must concern the same reality. Therefore, it must be 
presumed that the metaphor can contribute to the development of reasoning, 
knowledge and communication (the metaphor enables us to identify more and 
more parts of the dynamical object). Peirce even wrote: “…that which was 
poetically divined shall be scientifically known.” (CP: 1.213). Furthermore, 
despite the fact that the scientific hypothesis and the metaphor in many ways 
are very different, they are both structurally and categorically related to the 
process of abduction (cf. Anderson 1987). In the Harvard Lecture “Pragmatism 
and Abduction” (1903), Peirce characterized the abductive inference in the 
following way:  
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The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, 
although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements 
of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting 
together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which 
flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation. (CP: 5.181) 
 
By virtue of the abductive inference, ideas that are new can be created. Thus, 
until now unknown relations between ideas can be established and new 
knowledge can be acquired, although only tentatively. In the “Nation”, where 
Peirce reviewed William James' famous work “The Principles of Psychology” 
(1891), he gave the abductive inference the following logical form: 
 
A well-recognized kind of object, M, has for its ordinary predicates P[1], 
P[2], P[3], etc., indistinctly recognized. 
The suggesting object, S, has these same predicates, P[1], P[2], P[3], etc. 
Hence, S is of the kind M.  
(CP: 8.64) 
 
Provided that metaphor can have a cognitive function, it has to be caused by its 
ability to bring forth new relations of similarity: since a representamen, [M], 
represents the representative character of a representamen, an object [S], by aid 
of similarity, represents an interpretant: “Hence, S is of the kind M”. If metaphor 
can have a cognitive function, and it is routed in the abductive reasoning, this 
also suggests its semeiosis is related to experience, since the first premise for 
abduction is the perceptual judgment (cf. CP: 5.16). And as we remember, 
according to Peirce, experience is our only true teacher. Consequently, the 
meaning of a metaphor cannot be constituted independently of the body's 
meeting the world. But it is important to stress as Haley does: 
 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 147-176, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
168 
…it [is not] only that our minds and mental structure are partly configured 
by our bodily experience in nature, and partly by cultural conventions 
whose schemes we are bound to impose on nature…nature itself is an 
extension or instantiation of Mind, just as surely as the human mind us 
another (and thus inherently similar) such extension. (Haley 1999: 437) 
 
Thus, it is not only a cultural and historical body which cognizes, but also an 
evolutionary body with a special mind. More precisely, it concerns an 
experiencing body, which has been and is capable of putting forth: 
“…spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason” (CP: 6.475), as Peirce wrote in 
“A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1908). In our ongoing attempts 
to successfully convert our surroundings into our Umwelt, e.g. in our ongoing 
attempts to represents these surroundings in a meaningful way, we have 
developed a sort of ability to make abductive inferences (cf. CP: 1.630; 7.219), 
and hereby e.g. the opportunity to create cognitive metaphors. The success of 
abduction, its ability to create cognition, relies upon an affinity or structural 
analogy between the human mind and matter. In the manuscript “History of 
Science” (c. 1896), Peirce drew attention to how abduction: “…goes upon the 
hope that there is sufficient affinity between the reasoner's mind and natures to 
render guessing not altogether hopeless…” (CP: 1.121), and he further explained 
this relation in another manuscript entitled “Guessing” (c. 1907): 
 
There are, indeed, puzzles, and one might well say mysteries, connected 
with the mental operation of guessing; - yes; more than one. There can, I 
think, be no reasonable doubt that man`s mind, having been developed 
under the influence…of nature, for that reason naturally thinks somewhat 
after nature`s pattern. (CP: 7.39)  
 
Through evolution, the human mind has developed under the influence of 
nature. Thus, our cognitive habits are defined by virtue of the relation to the 
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world. Metaphor, as a cognitive mechanism, must be thought of as based on the 
aforesaid structural analogy. That we can communicate and understand feelings, 
actions and thoughts by the aid of metaphor, and thereby create new cognitions, 
must be due to a continuous relation between mind and matter. In Haley´s 
words: 
 
In short, to whatever extent we really are capable to understand nature, it 
is only because our minds really are like nature. And it is only within the 
context of this large likeness that we are capable of understanding 
ourselves and one another – which clearly includes the expression of our 
thoughts and feelings to one another through…metaphor. (Haley 1999: 
435)  
 
The same analogy exerts pressures and constraints regarding what similarities 
we can put forth metaphorically. The metaphorical meaning cannot exclusively 
be rooted in social convention. The similarity is motivated and realistically 
determined because experience, body, sign, abduction and guessing instinct are 
parts of the same intricate relation.  
According to Eco, every discourse regarding metaphor, as he writes in 
“SPL”, should begin with (tentatively) answering the following question - and 
thereby retracing the classical opposition between phusis and nomos - is 
language: 
 
…(a) by its nature, and originally, metaphorical, and the mechanism of 
metaphor establishes linguistic activity, every rule or convention arising 
thereafter in order to discipline…the metaphorizing potential [?] or (b) [is] 
language (and every other semiotic system) a rule-governed machine, a 
predictive machine that says which phrases can be generated and which 
not…a machine with regard to which metaphor constitutes a 
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breakdown…but at the same time the drive toward linguistic renewal [?]. 
(Eco 1984: 88)   
 
Eco endorses the latter point of view, and stresses how it is only possible to 
speak about the metaphor metaphorically, or that we have imposed a kind of 
circularity, which veils what we are speaking about, if we accept that language 
per definition is organized metaphorically. Perhaps after all a peculiar point of 
view coming form some one, who speaks as Tejera (1997) writes in his fine 
article “Peirce, Eco and the Necessity of Interpretation” (1977): 
 
…metaphorically about theory and semiotic phenomena so often that he 
cannot say he has dealt with uniform literality, even on his own 
understanding of the literality of the pronouncements among which his 
metaphors are embedded. (Tejera 1997: 157) 
 
Be that as it may, here we will focus on the fact that, according to Eco, the 
process of metaphorization is important for the generation of sense and new 
knowledge; in metaphor, the creative potential of language (or any other sign 
system for that matter) sees through. In order to understand this, we have to 
return shortly to an important feature regarding the code. According to Eco, the 
code not only allows us to put forth “semiotic judgments”, or judgments which 
are foreseen by the code, e.g. “all humans are mortal” (if that was the case, in 
the end all our messages would be tautological), but also judgments which are 
factual, e.g. “Umberto Eco is mortal”, and “meta-semiotic judgments”, 
judgments by which we can call the very legitimacy of the code itself into 
question (Eco 1979: 67). Of course, the question is how the code, as Eco writes in 
“RR”: 
 
…which in principle ought to generated the speaking subject`s entire 
cultural system, is able to generate both factual messages…and above all 
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messages which place in doubt the very structure of the code itself. (Eco 
1979: 67) 
 
The answer is that the code allows what Eco designates “rule-governed 
creativity”; that we are able to endow already known cultural entities with new 
semantic markers is due to the fact that the code has an arbitrary character, and 
this arbitrary character of the code opens to creativity; e.g.  when a new 
expression refers to a new content as a response to a new experience. And this is 
exactly where the metaphor enters the picture. As Eco writes: ”the first example 
of such creativity is provided…by the use of metaphors.” (Eco 1979: 68). The 
metaphor can cause: “…a new semantic coupling not preceded by any stipulation 
by the code…but which generates a new stipulation by the code.” (Eco 1979: 69). 
Put in another way: it is by the use of the metaphor that we can make: 
”…shortcuts within the process of semiosis” (Eco 1984: 129), a shortcut in the 
process of signification, which can cause creation of new patterns within the 
semantic network, or a restructuring of the code itself, e.g. in the form of an 
expansion of the code or an improvement of its potentials. Consequently, to Eco, 
the metaphor is an important semiotic vehicle, not simply and solely an: 
“…embellishment”. When originally and creatively used they in fact can change 
the way in which the content is taken into consideration.” (Eco 1976: 279). Since 
the semantic system, according to Eco, organizes the way we think about the 
world or how we see things, and since the metaphor can rearrange the very 
same semantic system, metaphor can also rearrange how we think about the 
world, or it can create parts of our reality, so to speak. Thus, metaphor becomes 
endowed with a cognitive function. It can provide us with insights into similarity, 
a similarity between interpretants, or cultural units, or, as Eco writes, metaphor 
can make us see: “…the subtle network of proportions between cultural units.” 
(Eco 1984: 102). The metaphor can make us understand the semantic system in a 
new and perhaps better way, how the system is structured and, most 
importantly, how it can be restructured; e.g. we get a glimpse of the pathways of 
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semiosis  which the semantic organization – sanctioned by the underlying chains 
of metonymical substitutions – allows us to see; whether or not the pathways 
are already open or they have to be opened by the use of metaphor. Eco claims 
that the most interesting metaphors are those where: “…the cultural process, 
the dynamics of semioisis, shows through.” (Eco 1984: 102), a qualitative criteria 
which is closely related to the degree of interpretative openness of the 
metaphor, or how far: “…a metaphor allows us to travel the pathways of the 
semiosis and to discover the labyrinths of the encyclopedia.” (Eco 1984: 126-
127). Thus, an open metaphor is a complex rhetorical figure, which does not 
allow semiosis to grind to a halt immediately. On the contrary, the open 
metaphor develops in a potentially infinite sequence of signs activating 
interpretative trajectories in the signifying process by relating sections of the sign 
network that may be very distant from each other. The more open the metaphor 
is, the more it opens to new and innovative interpretative possibilities within the 
code, or the semantic network, to the creation of new worlds, new perspectives, 
by its telling of what is possible. But even though Eco underlines the value of 
metaphor in the growth of reasoning, knowledge and communication, this does 
not entail that he wants to endow it with a specific aletic function: “…seeing the 
metaphor as a cognitive tool does not mean studying it in terms of truth values.” 
(Eco 1984: 89). Whether or not it is possible to make a true logical operation by 
using a metaphor does not concern Eco. Because, as he stresses, the one who 
uses a metaphor says something about a “thing”, which every body can see that 
it is clearly not. Or put in another way: “…someone [who] creates a 
metaphor…is…,literally speaking, lying…” (Eco 1984: 84). Altogether, Eco warns 
against wild exaggerations concerning the semiotic potential of metaphor; true 
metaphor can provide new cognitive models, can create new world views etc., 
but it should not be privileged over the instruments which can be found within 
the disciplines of logic.  Knowledge still has a authorized channel in science, while 
the real force of metaphor is to add something new; something possible; not 
something radically different, but something beyond the actual, something 
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which adds to our understanding. An understanding concerning what Eco 
designates the encyclopedia or the “library of libraries”. Eco writes in “SPL”:    
 
…the truth is that the metaphor is the tool that permits us to understand 
the encyclopedia better. This is the type of knowledge that the metaphor 
stakes out for us. (Eco 1984: 129) 
 
Thus, thanks to capacity of metaphor to identify relations of similarities, we can 
navigate in the encyclopedia – e.g. make short cuts within the encyclopedia, and 
thereby further our knowledge. That is, we can further our knowledge about the 
total cultural registrations concerning science, philosophy, artistic discourse, 
religion, mythology and daily discourse etc. etc. – in the verbal languages and the 
sign systems generally. This, according to Eco, is exactly the value of metaphor, 
enhancing the process of reasoning, communication and knowledge concerning 
the encyclopedia, and thereby being structural to the very process itself. 
 
Final interpretants  
Although semiosis is potentially infinite, locally, the signifying process of cause 
grinds to a halt; also the semioisis of this article. However, before the semantic 
network is left for now, let us try to sum up the result of the article in the 
following short points:  
 
 
Charles Peirce vs. Umberto Eco 
(0) A Phanero-semeiotic definition of 
the metaphor; a realistic notion. 
A structural-semantic definition of the 
metaphor; a nominalistic notion. 
(i) The metaphor as category: sign 
relation. 
Sign function. 
(i.i) The nature of relation: motivated; 
similarity originates from a real 
Conventional; similarity emanates 
from a code, a system of content, a 
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Firstness; the quality of the similarity 
has real being before the metaphorical 
semeiosis; the similarity is motivated 
and realistically determined because 
experience, body, sign, abduction and 
guessing instinct are part of the same 
intricate relation. 
network of interpretants. 
(ii) The metaphor enters into a 
semeiotic relation with the other two 
hypoicons, diagram and image; the 
relation regards interdependency, or 
the relation is reciprocal.  
The metaphor interacts with 
metonymy; metaphor depends upon a 
subjacent network of arbitrarily 
stipulated contiguities, and hence 
metonymy. 
(iii) The function of metaphor:  The 
metaphor is a cognitive mechanism 
within the process of abduction; the 
cognitive metaphor can represent the 
“dynamics of the real”, and in the end 
the very truth.  
The metaphor can cause creative 
couplings within a semantic network; 
it can point to new similarities 
between interpretants, cultural units, 
and consequently cause new insights. 
The metaphor has a cognitive function 
recognizing or introducing order 
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